What the agent does
The agent reads the forms and the session before it chooses a scheme. In an app shaped like the basics/todo member of actix/examples, Cargo.toml takes actix-web 4.11, actix-session 0.11 with the cookie-session feature, actix-files and the 2024 edition from the workspace, and pins sqlx 0.9 on SQLite and tera 2 itself. src/main.rs builds a SessionMiddleware over CookieSessionStore with a zeroed 64-byte signing key and cookie_secure(false), and registers three handlers: GET / renders templates/index.html.tera, POST /todo creates a task from a web::Form<CreateForm>, and POST /todo/{id} reads a _method field of put or delete to toggle or remove one. src/session.rs already stores a flash message in the session under the key flash. Every state change is a plain HTML form post with no token, so any page the user has open can submit to /todo on their behalf.
The agent adds a csrf module beside session.rs. On each request that renders the page, csrf::token(&session) returns the token stored in the session under csrf_token or generates a 32-byte random one with rand, which the workspace already pins, base64-encodes it and stores it. index inserts it into the Tera context as csrf_token, and templates/index.html.tera gets <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{csrf_token}}"> in the create form and in both per-task forms. CreateForm and UpdateForm gain a csrf_token field, and a csrf::verify(&session, &form.csrf_token) call at the top of create and update compares it to the session value in constant time with subtle and returns error::ErrorForbidden on a mismatch, which the existing ErrorHandlers can map to a static page like 400.html and 404.html.
The cookie session's SameSite default of Lax already blocks most cross-site posts, and the pull request says so; the token is for browsers and embeds where that is not enough, and for a reviewer who wants defence that does not depend on a cookie attribute. The signing key comment in main.rs is left as the example has it, but the pull request notes the key must be real before cookie_secure is turned on.
The example has no tests, so the agent adds src/tests.rs using actix_web::test::init_service with the same session middleware and a temporary SQLite database created through the migrations/ folder: a GET / yields a Set-Cookie and a token in the body, a POST /todo with that cookie and token answers 302, the same post with a wrong token answers 403, and a post with no cookie answers 403. It runs cargo check --workspace --bins --examples --tests and cargo test -p todo with DATABASE_URL=sqlite://./todo.db after sqlx database create and sqlx migrate run, the steps .github/workflows/ci.yml performs, plus cargo clippy and the just check formatting pass, and pastes the output in the pull request.
Start it with one API call
POST https://api.phoenix.so/o/{org}/sessions with this body:
{
"agent": "claude",
"input": "Add CSRF protection to the basics/todo app in this Actix Web repository and open a pull request. Read basics/todo/Cargo.toml, basics/todo/src/main.rs, basics/todo/src/api.rs, basics/todo/src/session.rs, basics/todo/templates/index.html.tera, basics/todo/.env, basics/todo/migrations/ and .github/workflows/ci.yml first. Add a csrf module that stores a random base64 token in the cookie session under csrf_token, generating it on first use with the rand crate from the workspace. Render it as a hidden csrf_token input in the create form and both per-task forms in the Tera template. Add a csrf_token field to CreateForm and UpdateForm and verify it against the session in constant time at the top of create and update, answering 403 on a mismatch or a missing session. Add tests with actix_web::test that cover a successful post with the token, a wrong token, and no cookie, against a temporary SQLite database built from the migrations. Run sqlx database create, sqlx migrate run, cargo check --workspace --bins --examples --tests, cargo clippy -p todo and cargo test -p todo, and paste the output in the pull request. Do not change other members of the workspace.",
"resources": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/your-org/your-app"
}
]
}- Get an API key. In the console, open Settings, then API keys, and create a key for your org. Send it in the Authorization header as a Bearer token.
- Send the request. POST the body in request.json to https://api.phoenix.so/o/{org}/sessions, with your repository as the resources URL. The run starts in its own cloud sandbox.
- Read what came back. Follow the run on its live stream or wait for the run.completed webhook, then read the result and its trajectory.
What comes back
What comes back is a pull request confined to basics/todo/: a new src/csrf.rs, a mod csrf line and three guarded handlers in src/api.rs, three hidden inputs in templates/index.html.tera, a src/tests.rs module, and Cargo.toml taking rand from the workspace and adding subtle. The description shows the cargo test -p todo summary, the cargo check and clippy results, and a curl transcript of a post without the token answering 403.
On a repository with the examples' workflow, the pull request runs the cargo check across the whole workspace and cargo test --workspace on the matrix, after the workflow's own sqlx database create and migrate run steps, so the new tests execute under the same database setup CI already has.
A reviewer checks that the comparison is constant time, that the token is regenerated when the session is cleared, that _method handling in update is still reached only after verification, and whether they also want the token checked on a Referer or Origin mismatch. Then they replace the zeroed signing key and enable cookie_secure behind TLS.
Run it on every security finding filed
A security review that files one finding per form-posting app can start one run per finding with this prompt and the finding's repository in resources, through a handler on the reader's server that calls POST /o/{org}/sessions. Each run reads its own templates and handlers, so an app with a dozen forms gets the hidden input in every one of them, and each run opens its own pull request.
Give the API key a webhook_url and Rush POSTs run.completed when each turn finishes, with the session_url to read the pull request and the 403 transcript from.
The use case this job follows, with its automation and trigger: Hand off a long task.
Why run it on Rush?
CSRF tokens are a cross-cutting change: a session helper, every form in every template, every handler that mutates state, and a test that proves the forbidden path actually fires. Doing it by hand means one missed form that silently stays open. In a Rush sandbox the agent edits them all, runs the suite with a real SQLite file built from the migrations, and keeps every cargo command and its output in the run's record.
The same request works on any Actix app that uses actix-session and server-rendered forms, and because the run opens a pull request through the Rush GitHub App, the fix for a finding arrives as a diff with the proof attached rather than as a ticket that waits.
Frequently asked questions
Isn't SameSite=Lax on the session cookie enough?
It blocks cross-site form posts in current browsers, and the pull request says so. The token covers browsers and contexts that do not honour it, and does not depend on a cookie attribute someone may later relax. Both together is the usual recommendation.
Does it add a dependency?
Two: rand for the token bytes, which the workspace Cargo.toml already pins, and subtle for the constant-time comparison, added to the crate's own Cargo.toml. No CSRF middleware crate is added, because the app's forms and session are simple enough that a module of about forty lines is clearer.
What happens to JSON or API clients?
This app has none; every mutation is a form post. If an API is added later, the pull request's note recommends a separate scope without the session middleware rather than exempting routes from the check.
Will the token survive the flash message?
Yes. The flash helper in session.rs removes only its own flash key, so the token under csrf_token stays for the life of the cookie session. A fresh browser session gets a new token on its first page load.
More Actix Web jobs
The same job on other stacks
- Add CSRF Protection to an aiohttp App (aiohttp)
- Add CSRF Protection to a CodeIgniter 4 App (CodeIgniter)
- Add CSRF Protection to a Fastify App (Fastify)